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Why Humanitarian Interventions
Succeed or Fail




Why do interstate interventions, even when carried out with the best of
intentions, so often fail to contain conflicts and support a peaceful set-
tlement? We argue that the extent of local participation exerts a strong
effect on the prospects for successful peace-building and reconstruction
efforts in the wake of humanitarian interventions. Even though the
population in target countries may sympathize with the goal of the
intervention, local populations are unlikely to feel a personal attach-
ment to a solution externally imposed unless actively consulted or
involved in the intervention strategy. Humanitarian interventions with-
out some form of local participation are likely to create cognitive dis-
sonance among the local population between the outcome and the
means chosen to implement it. We evaluate our hypotheses about the
relationship between local involvement and successful post-conflict
reconstruction by looking at variation in conflict and local involvement
over time in two humanitarian interventions, Bosnia (1991–95) and
Somalia (1987–97). Consistent with our hypotheses about how lack of
local involvement can undermine post-conflict reconstruction efforts in
the wake of interventions, we find that phases with more local involve-
ment are associated with lower levels of conflict.
Keywords: Bosnia; cognitive dissonance; conflict resolution; humanitar-
ian intervention; Somalia
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has on numer-
ous occasions pondered or carried out armed interventions within
sovereign states to address humanitarian contingencies such as genocide or
severe civil conflicts. Despite good intentions, interstate interventions rarely
succeed in establishing permanent solutions to conflicts and humanitarian
crises within states (see Weiss, 1999; Weiss and Collins, 2000; Regan, 2000).
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In this article, we develop one explanation for why humanitarian interven-
tions so often fail. We argue that the failure to consult or actively integrate
local parties in target countries during the peace-building process can cre-
ate problems of cognitive dissonance in humanitarian interventions: a
population that is largely uninvolved in a humanitarian intervention is less
likely to cooperate with the intervening parties or expend efforts to make
the intervention successful. Whereas individuals positively value things
they have strived hard to achieve, they are less likely to feel any attach-
ment to or responsibility for initiatives or outcomes that are seen as exter-
nally imposed.
We begin with a brief overview of the idea of humanitarian interven-
tions and their increasing salience in international affairs. We then outline
how the failure to involve local populations may lead to an adverse rela-
tionship between interveners and target populations that can undermine
humanitarian interventions. We provide an empirical evaluation of our
argument by looking at how variation in local involvement in two human-
itarian interventions, Bosnia (1991–95) and Somalia (1987–97), is associ-
ated with differences in the variation in conflict and stability. We find that
phases in the peace-building process with high local participation are
associated with lower levels of hostility, while phases with little local
involvement tend to be associated with escalating violence. On a con-
structive note, our research points to various implications for how peace-
building efforts should be designed after the military component of an
intervention has been completed to increase the prospects for stable
peace and successful conflict settlement. In the final section we discuss
some of the key policy implications as well as a framework for identifying
local population involvement in broader, comparative tests of humanitar-
ian interventions.
Humanitarian Interventions in Contemporary International
Politics
Despite international norms of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
sovereign states, external interventions are by no means a new phe-
nomenon in international politics. The end of the Cold War, however,
appears to have fundamentally changed the motivations for interventions
in other states. Where states traditionally have intervened in the affairs of
other states to defend either their strategic or private interests, humanitar-
ian concerns, such as preventing human suffering in severe civil wars, have
increasingly become cited as a rationale for involvement in other states
(e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Somalia).
Interventions in the domestic affairs of failed states are often regarded as
acceptable under international law if they are designed to address human
rights violations and human suffering. Following the Kosovo crisis, for
example, the Clinton administration developed a doctrine advocating that
the USA should actively intervene to prevent human rights abuses pro-
vided it could do so without significant casualties.1 This shift is reflected in
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numerous United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions and attempts
to redefine the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from
a defensive alliance to a peace-keeping/peace-making organization. As the
end of the Cold War diminished the strategic competition between the major
powers in international politics, the atrocities in civil wars during the 1990s
stimulated demands for stronger human rights protection in international
law and limits to state sovereignty (see Weiss and Collins, 2000: 34).
Although some researchers have questioned whether the humanitarian
justification of interventions is a mere guise for other less altruistic motives
(see, e.g., Gibbs, 1997), we do not see clear immediate benefits to interven-
ing countries in most cases of interventions that are justified on humani-
tarian grounds. We assume that the humanitarian concerns and motives
expressed by intervening countries are sincere and that their main objec-
tive is to prevent or limit severe humanitarian crises such as prolonged
civil wars or genocides (see also Regan, 2000). Although the question of
why and when states may be willing to intervene to address humanitarian
crises is of great interest in and of itself (see, e.g., Hermann and Kegley,
2001), we take decisions to engage in humanitarian interventions as given.
Our main interest lies in providing an alternative causal explanation of
why humanitarian interventions often fail, thus affecting the prospects of
a successful settlement.
Perceived Failures of Humanitarian Interventions: Why Local
Involvement Matters
There are frustratingly few cases where humanitarian interventions have
clearly succeeded in addressing the conditions motivating the interventions.
The optimism that might be conveyed by relatively successful stories such
as Haiti and East Timor (albeit of short duration) is tempered by a list of
cases perceived as disastrous failures such as Somalia. In many other cases,
such as Kosovo and Bosnia, peace-keeping operations missions may have
brought about an end to fighting, but the success in reaching the stated
long-term objectives of the intervention seems mixed at best.
Humanitarian interventions might appear ineffective in securing human
rights and building a stable peace, but simply asserting that humanitarian
interventions often do not work tells us little about why humanitarian inter-
ventions so often fail and whether peace-building efforts may have more
prospects for success under some conditions. There are many possible rea-
sons why complicated and ambitious efforts to create peace through
humanitarian interventions fail. It is often argued, for example, that lack of
willingness of the interveners to pay significant costs and an extreme aver-
sion to casualties lead to half-baked efforts at peace-keeping on the cheap
that may be insufficient to create successful peace-building (see, e.g.,
Mueller, 2000).
We do not argue that the above-mentioned factors do not matter for the
prospects for successful peace-making interventions, but wish to highlight
the important role of local participation for successful peace-building.After
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the short-term goals of humanitarian interventions (such as containing
direct violence or securing food supplies) are met, intervening countries
face the greater challenge of meeting long-term goals of successful conflict
resolution or guarantees for a stable peace. We argue that the latter type of
goals will often require a more enduring commitment to a country or region
as well as some degree of active involvement of or support from the local
population.
We use cognitive dissonance theory to assess local populations’ need to
be actively involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in order for them
to significantly value the efforts or outcomes of any power-sharing mea-
sures and institution-building measures. We define as local participation
policies that include recognition of all sides in the conflict as legitimate par-
ties, committed efforts in peace-building, i.e. observing and training for
elections, decommissioning weapons, training police and security forces,
and assisting local parties in establishing institutions.2 In our definition of
local participation we do not include the supply of military assistance to the
opposing parties, as the increase in armaments can only fuel and prolong
the conflict.
Existing research makes it clear that developing local capacity to sustain
peace involves great challenges, and suggests that strategies that seem
effective at the initial military phase of interventions often may prove coun-
terproductive for the long-term goals. Minear and Weiss (1993) argue that
externally provided aid and relief often fuels further conflict, as combatants
compete for rents and abuse the available funds to finance continued
domestic conflict. Time and resource constraints often prevent the inter-
vening parties from developing long-term strategies for conflict settlement,
and often give rise to short-term strategies that breed dependency among
the local population and frequently are detrimental to a country’s long-
term recovery. In the aftermath of a military intervention, the intervening
states and their military agencies cease to be the sole relevant actors.
International organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) typically come to play an important part that complements the
purely military component of the interventions (see Duffield and
Prendergast, 1994).
In an analysis of 123 interventions from 1944–98 based on the Doyle and
Sambanis (2000) data, Gizelis and Kosek (2003) have indeed shown that
more integrative intervention strategies involving the UN are more likely
to lead to successful settlements. This is consistent with the idea that inter-
ventions that are seen as legitimate by the local actors and more often
involve local populations are more likely to be met with success.
Availability of global resources gives the UN an advantage over NGOs and
states in identifying and involving groups that can motivate local participa-
tion and support.
At the outset of peace-building efforts, progress on short-term security
issues requires coordination between military parties that can help contain
conflict and civilian agencies that address non-military aspects of humani-
tarian crises, such as immediate relief and supplies. In the long run, how-
ever, external assistance by itself is not enough, and successful
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peace-building must develop meaningful cooperation with local parties.
Whereas NGOs may be independent agencies in the sense that they are not
part of the military agencies that carry out the external interventions, they
nonetheless typically lack a local organizational base or representation.
Relief workers aiming at saving lives in acute humanitarian emergencies
usually have little time to acquaint themselves with local culture and habits
(Minear and Weiss, 1993: 33). Pre-existing local institutions, structures and
traditions are usually ignored in failing states, and NGOs fail to capitalize
on opportunities to incorporate locals into relief work (Weiss and Collins,
2000: 137).As criticism of host governments can make relief work more dif-
ficult, NGOs engaged in relief work have also tended to avoid anything that
can be seen as lack of impartiality or involvement in local political affairs,
and often remain silent or overlook human rights violations.This status quo
orientation can often make significant segments of local populations more
sceptical of the intervening parties and less likely to cooperate or comply
with conflict resolution efforts.
Successful settlement and conflict resolution requires a level of partici-
pation by local actors in the peace-building process that intervening parties
have rarely managed to foster, as attested by the two cases we will focus on
later, namely Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia). According to
Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, consistency with one’s
beliefs and actions is a key motivator of human conduct. When an individ-
ual perceives dissonance or a conflict between his or her attitudes and
actions, the individual is likely to feel discomfort and seek ways to eliminate
the dissonance between beliefs and behaviour. Dissonance can be elimi-
nated either by reducing the importance of the conflicting beliefs or by
altering the conflicting behaviour (Griffin, 1997). It is generally much
harder to change actual behaviour than beliefs. That is, when faced with a
conflict between beliefs and behaviour, individuals eliminate cognitive dis-
sonance by finding a justification to reconcile the apparent conflict between
stated values and their actual behaviour.3
Aronson (1969) argues that the inconsistency between beliefs and
actions is not logical, but psychological. The amount of effort individuals
invest in an activity proportionally affects the level of dissonance devel-
oped. In other words, if we invest time and effort to accomplish a task, our
attitude changes to justify the behaviour.4 This is also related to the hypoth-
esis that personal responsibility over a future bad outcome is the greatest
predictor of dissonance. When individuals perceive that they have a choice
to make regarding future actions dissonance can be created. If there is no
perceived choice, then without personal accountability dissonance is low
and individuals have no incentive to alter their attitudes (Bern, 1967;
Aronson, 1969, 1992; Wicklund and Brehm, 1976). Moreover, cognitive dis-
sonance is also related to group interactions. If individuals think in terms of
a collective reference group, then group conformity will impose consistent
attitudes on the individual members.
Although the theoretical formation of cognitive dissonance emphasizes
processes at the individual level (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1969), such
mechanisms have many observable implications manifesting themselves at
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the level of collective outcomes.Although it is difficult to observe individual
beliefs and how they motivate individual action, we can observe how
hypothesized individual attitudes and responses to a situation will be
reflected within a group context. Empirical and experimental studies in
social psychology suggest that external actors can influence and motivate
foreign cultures by inviting influential figures from the in-groups to partici-
pate in the decision-making process. Hernandez and Iyengar (2001), for
example, claim that the identity of the influencing agent with respect to the
group is essential to motivate individuals to fulfil their duties and social
obligations. They suggest that individuals respond more to authority figures
from within the group than outsiders, even when those outsiders are con-
strued as benevolent. Others have shown that individuals tend to adjust to
their environment if the outcome or decision-making processes giving rise
to prevailing conditions are construed as contextually appropriate to the
social and cultural reality of the local population (see Heine, 1997; Hong
and Chiu, 2001).
Dissonance theory, thus, can be applied to analyse the impact of
humanitarian interventions on the local populations and their response
to the intervention and the post-conflict reconstruction process.
Dissonance theory suggests that the failure to include the local popula-
tion and elites who have wide appeal within the local communities in
intervention strategies often may undermine the effectiveness of peace-
making efforts. Hence, the theory suggests that if the local population is
involved in the reconstruction process and perceives that it can shape the
final outcome of the intervention, a possible failure of the intervention
will create strong dissonance. Dissonance among the locals could be
counterweighed by having them actively contribute to the reconstruction
process. The more the local population contributes to efforts to rebuild
civil society and create stable institutions, the more they will value the
outcome of a peaceful and successful settlement. Likewise, if locals per-
ceive that their input in the reconstruction process is minimal or the new
institutions are inappropriate to their social and cultural reality, they are
likely to regard the failure of humanitarian interventions as inevitable.
Under such circumstances, the recurrence of violence will loom over
attempts to build institutions that are not sustainable without the
presence of external forces.
Our main interest revolves around how efforts by external agents (e.g.
NGOs, IGOs and other states) to involve locals to participate in the conflict
resolution process can enhance their motivation to strive for a successful
settlement and thereby increase the effectiveness of humanitarian inter-
ventions.5 We can derive two testable hypotheses from cognitive dissonance
theory which highlight how the relationship and dynamics between inter-
vening and targeted parties in humanitarian interventions shape the
prospects for success.
H1: The more time and effort the local population invests in peace-
building operations the higher the likelihood that a humanitarian
intervention will succeed.
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H2: The more the local population becomes accountable for reconstruction
efforts, the higher the likelihood that a humanitarian intervention will
succeed.
The application of cognitive dissonance in humanitarian interventions is
also consistent with common claims in the literature on commitment
(Fearon, 1998; Lake and Rothchild, 1998). The more committed external
actors are to the process, whether states or IGOs and NGOs, the level of
investment and efforts by the locals increases proportionally, which thereby
would create a high level of dissonance should their efforts fail. The higher
level of dissonance acts to directly motivate the locals, who become
invested in the success of the reconstruction process. Instead, in cases like
Somalia, the hastened departure of the US forces amid increasing violence
left the local population passive bystanders in the peace-building process
and created widespread perceptions of external actors as the ‘real enemy’
of the local population. Hence, we can formulate the following hypothesis
regarding the role of external actors:
H3: The more committed external actors are in the process of humanitar-
ian intervention, the higher the likelihood that the local population will
embrace the reconstruction process.
Testing Hypotheses on Participation and Successful
Resolution: Somalia and Bosnia
It is difficult to observe and measure whether the local population’s beliefs
and attitudes change in response to specific policies by the intervening par-
ties; we can, however, observe levels of violence and cooperation in a given
time period, a behavioural manifestation of how locals interact with each
other and the interveners. Moreover, there are no available indicators of
the participation of local populations in humanitarian interventions. Hence,
we decide to examine two case studies and try to assess the argument pre-
sented in this article. The analysis of the two cases allows us to identify the
kind of policies of the intervening parties that seem to gain support from
local actors.
We examine two cases of interventions in the 1990s, namely Bosnia and
Somalia. Somalia and Bosnia may seem unlikely cases to compare based on
the characteristics of the countries as such, but both provide examples of
the range of humanitarian interventions in the early 1990s. In each case, the
decision to intervene was based on the view that force was required to end
the physical suffering of civilians and help foster peace and stability
(Parekh, 1997: 53).6
If we consider the two cases over time, Somalia and Bosnia show consid-
erable variation in conflict and local involvement in different phases of the
conflicts.Although Somalia has been a clear-cut case of a failure, Bosnia can
be characterized as a mixed success, in particular after August of 1995, when
peace-building efforts have been more successful. Whereas local participa-
tion and cooperation with domestic parties remains consistently low in
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Somalia, Bosnia shows considerable variation in degree of local participa-
tion over time. Contrary to common perceptions of the former Yugoslav
republic as a failure for international peace-building efforts since August of
1995, Bosnia has been close to a success story with respect to the possibil-
ity of peace-building through humanitarian intervention.
Table 1 gives a stylized overview of the cases of Somalia and Bosnia. For
each column or overall conflict phase, we identify whether there was any
cooperation between the military and civilian components of the interven-
tion, and whether the local population was involved in the peace-building
process. We then examine whether these differences in policies are associ-
ated with differences in the overall conflict or incidents of violence.
Although it is difficult to observe and measure whether individual beliefs
and attitudes change in the manner that cognitive dissonance theory holds,
we can observe how such changes in attitudes among the local population
are manifested in incidents of violence and cooperation (behavior). We use
the monthly incidents of violence and cooperation as an indicator of the
local population’s attitude towards the process of the intervention.
Similarly, we use incidents of cooperation and conflict to capture the atti-
tudes of the intervening parties towards the locals and identify any trends
of cooperation or conflict. If our hypotheses are correct, we can expect to
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TABLE 1
Bosnia 1 Bosnia 2
Somalia (1992–95) (August 1995)
Did a military and a humanitarian Yes Yes Yes
operation simultaneously take place?
Was there any cooperation between the Yes No Yes
military and the civilian component of
the operation?
At what level did they cooperate? Minimally Not at all Extensively
Did the external actors bring in local Partially yes1 Yes Yes
representatives?
Did the external actors consistently No No Yes
enforce their policies for at least 2
years?
Did they take sides? Yes Neutral Government
Did the intervening parties and the local No No Yes
authorities reach an agreement which
included future plans for development?
Was any major power leading the Yes Yes Yes
operation?
1 On two occasions, Ethiopia — under the auspices of the UN — attempted to mediate in
the conflict. Since 1993 there have been several attempts to bring the different groups to the
negotiation table. Yet none of the efforts provided measurable results in terms of data.
observe lower levels of total conflict in the periods that had a greater local
involvement in peace-building efforts.
In examining the level of conflict in the two cases, we look at the event
data for each. Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) have collected event data
for a series of regional coding, based on automated coding of Reuters news
reports (for an analysis of their data from Bosnia, see Goldstein and
Pevehouse, 1997). Each newspaper report is coded as an event based on the
action that a reported actor takes toward a particular target. The specific
actions taken are classified using the World Event Interaction Survey
(WEIS) event data categories as more general types of events. Although
the original WEIS categories are nominal, Goldstein (1992) has devised a
scaling method that assigns each WEIS event category a conflict-coopera-
tion score between –10 and 10. A value of –10 indicates the most extreme
case of conflictual event (i.e. military attacks and declarations of war),
whereas values closer to 10 indicate more cooperative actions, such as
granting aid or assistance.
Studies using event data usually aggregate the total number of events
over some time period to create a conflict-cooperation time series. Event
data studies usually look at dyadic interactions to examine how one party
responds to the actions of another party. In this study, however, our interest
is to examine how humanitarian interventions and efforts to incorporate
the local population in the peace-building process influence overall levels
of conflict, so we aggregate over all actors in each conflict. The daily event
data series is very jagged and has multiple spikes, as some days have many
events and some have none. We aggregate over each one month period to
get a more stable measure of the overall level of conflict.To summarize, our
conflict measure is the sum of all the Goldstein scores for all events in a
conflict in a particular month, with lower values indicating more intense
conflict. Figures 1 and 2 show the conflict-cooperation level for Somalia and
Bosnia, respectively.
In the next section we narrate the main features of our two interventions,
Somalia and Bosnia, with special emphasis on the extent and lack of local
involvement. We then examine how these differences in local involvement
predict variation in overall conflict and cooperation.7
Somalia
Somalia is an ethnically and linguistically unified country, which is divided
along clan lines rather than along ethnic and/or religious groups. Since 1992,
when widespread conflict and food shortages motivated an international
intervention, Somalia has remained a failed state, without a functional state
government or central authority. Somalia is perhaps the most notorious
failed interstate intervention, in the sense that the intervention has failed in
creating power-sharing mechanisms that could accommodate the different
clans and foster cooperation.
In Somalia, the intervening forces quickly became engulfed in factional
violence instead of facilitating conflict resolution and management efforts
based on traditional inter-clan mechanisms. The role of the USA was even
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more counterproductive, as they clearly took sides against the clan of the
warlord Aideed (also spelled Aydid) in the second part of 1993. Given the
structure of the Somali clan system, the biased line at the outset was highly
detrimental to achieving cooperation between clans and local factions. In
the last phase of the intervention (UNOSOM II), the United States refused
to recognize Aideed as a local leader, but instead tried to arrest him for his
role in the death of 24 Pakistani UN peace-keepers.The targeting of Aideed
generated increasing hostility to the intervention forces, which reached a
climax on 3 October 1993 with the death of 18 Americans and hundreds of
Somalis. This is reflected in Figure 1 by a dramatic negative spike in the
level of conflict. The ambush of a patrol of US rangers by forces loyal to
Aideed led to a reversal in the American policy on Somalia, where troops
were withdrawn. Eventually, most other UN troops and personnel were
also called back (see Weiss, 1999: 90).
Figure 1 illustrates how intervention in Somalia failed to bring an end to
the conflict, but instead produced a negative trend toward greater levels of
violence. Since the failure of the military component of the humanitarian
intervention in 1993, the UN and neighbouring Ethiopia have launched sev-
eral efforts to promote peace negotiations and power-sharing among the
Somali clans. Invariably, these efforts have failed. The main problem with
the current power-sharing plans in Somalia is that they do not take into
account the segmented clan system of Somalia, which divides the Somali
society along lines similar to ethnic and religious divisions. Although mech-
anisms of conflict resolution traditionally have existed among the different
clans, the civil war and its ramifications have largely destroyed these
networks, thereby rendering peace-making attempts much more difficult
(Farah, 2003).
The humanitarian intervention in Somalia exacerbated divisions among
local factions. As many locals came to perceive the intervention as illegiti-
mate, they had little interest in participating in the peace-building efforts. In
the language of cognitive dissonance theory, the Somalis did not develop a
vested interest in the outcome of the humanitarian intervention, but
remained aloof observers, as suggested by H1 and H2. There were never
meaningful efforts to make them active participants in the peace-building
process by the intervening parties, which could have helped make them
more accountable for securing a peaceful settlement and maintaining
efforts to contain violence.
Our criteria for local participation in Table 1 help identify some of the
sources of problems in Somalia. First, the cooperation between the civilian
and the military component of the humanitarian intervention was luke-
warm at best, creating inconsistencies between short-term actions and mea-
sures to reach long-term goals. Although Operation Restore Hope was
motivated by facilitating the distribution of humanitarian aid in Somalia,
American soldiers were not allowed to directly participate in food distribu-
tion (see Weiss (1999) on cooperation problems between the civilian and
the military component of the Somalian intervention). Second, no agree-
ment was ever reached between the intervening parties and the local popu-
lation during the intervention. The US-led Operation Restoration Hope
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(also known as Unified Task Force) had evolved into UNOSOM II, the first
UN military intervention without the prior consent of the local state
authorities. The low level of commitment among locals became reflected in
the attitudes of the local population, who treated the intervening parties as
illegitimate interveners, alien to local culture and political life. Third, the
intervening parties followed inconsistent policies, with ever-changing objec-
tives as to the goals of the operation and decommissioning. Inconsistent
policies and lack of commitment led to lower levels of involvement by the
local population as well; an outcome consistent with H3.
UNOSOM I initially succeeded in bringing starvation under control, con-
sistent with the initial goals of the operation, and the warlords appeared to
be ready to negotiate (see Figure I, where the values of the Goldstein score
for some periods even reach positive values). The operation took a differ-
ent course with the new Clinton administration in 1993. While the initial
operation was strictly humanitarian in purpose, the Clinton administration
expanded the original mandate to include policing and governance; even
though the official policy was that the United States could not tolerate casu-
alties. Moreover, it was unclear whether Somalia should be under UN
trusteeship or negotiations with local authorities, including in some cases
the warlords, should be fostered. The solution of trusteeship was vehe-
mently rejected by the other African countries as reminiscent of colonial-
ism (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 1995: 10–12). The conflicting policies
transformed the US-led Operation Restore Hope into a hunt for warlords
in Mogadishu and destroyed any prospects for a peaceful settlement in the
critical time of summer of 1993 (Weiss and Collins, 2000: 83–4).8
We can evaluate the differences in level of conflict more formally by com-
paring the mean of the Goldstein conflict and cooperation score for four dif-
ferent time periods from 1991 until 1997.We created the four periods based
on specific events that marked the process of the intervention.As Tables 2–5
clearly show there is an increase in violence during the first phase of the mil-
itarized interstate intervention.Although the levels of violence decline after
the departure of the US forces in early 1994, the Goldstein score of conflict
for the period 1994–7 remains lower (–68.059) than the period prior to UN
and US intervention. The mean is –20.060 for the year before the launch of
UNOSOM I in 1991. Thus, the militarized intervention, an operation antag-
onistic to the local leaders, in this case seems to have led to higher levels of
violence rather than greater cooperation.
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Somalia 1987–97
TABLE 2
Goldstein score of conflict events, Somalia, 1991–92
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 72 –20.060 82.126
In sum, these results support our contention that the effects of any inte-
grative attempts by the UN were cancelled by the policy choice of the mil-
itary component of the intervention to take sides against powerful clan
leaders. In the end, the local population came not to value the humanitar-
ian intervention as a worthy cause to support, despite its positive aspira-
tions. Dissonance developed among the local population, as there was no
feeling of responsibility over the final outcome of the humanitarian inter-
vention and its possible success in building a stable peace. Our argument
suggests that as the Somalis did not engage in any meaningful cooperation
with the efforts of the intervening parties, the local population became less
likely to endorse the goals of the international intervention or see any value
in their efforts to build a peaceful settlement.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
After the collapse of Yugoslavia as a state, the Vance–Owen plan, intro-
duced in the period 1992–3 to contain the conflict in Bosnia, entailed one of
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TABLE 3
Goldstein score of conflict events, Somalia, 01/1992–10/1993
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 9 –399.689 284.874
score
TABLE 4
Goldstein score of conflict events, Somalia, 11/1993–12/1993
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 3 –358.567 202.421
score
TABLE 5
Goldstein score of conflict events, Somalia, 01/1994–07/1997
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 41 –68.059 71.990
score
the most detailed plans of power-sharing constructed by external media-
tors. The Vance–Owen plan tried to address shared power management in
an area where the three religious groups were demographically intermin-
gled. The basic outline of the plan was based on the demographic realities
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and envisioned a weak central government and a
national legislation based on strict proportionality; however, it failed to
enhance a peaceful resolution as it ultimately was rejected by the Bosnian
Serb parliament. The Vance–Owen plan failed as the two principal negotia-
tors lacked influence with or leverage over the hardliners. The end of the
Vance–Owen plan efforts led to increased violence, as both the Serbs and
the Croats attempted to achieve their territorial aspirations through mili-
tary force. Figure 2 and Tables 6–7 illustrate that at the early stages of the
civil war in Bosnia the failed humanitarian intervention led to a continuous
increase in levels of conflict. Figure 2 shows a steady increase in monthly
violent incidents from June of 1992 until December of 1995.
Similarly, comparison of the monthly aggregated conflict incidents over
the period 1991–5 shows that since the onset of the conflict and despite a
fully developed peace-keeping operation, the levels of conflict were contin-
uously increasing (see Tables 6 and 7). If we compare the Goldstein score
of conflict from 1991 to December of 1993, there is an increase in the
monthly levels of conflict.
The attempts by the external actors to keep as neutral a position as pos-
sible during the first stages of the intervention in Bosnia failed, as severe
problems of coordination between the civilian and the military component
of the intervention plagued the peace-making efforts. During the first three
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Bosnia (1991–96)
TABLE 6
Goldstein score of conflict events, Bosnia, 1991–12/1991
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 12 –252.567 295.188
score
TABLE 7
Goldstein score of conflict events, Bosnia, 01/1992–12/1993
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 24 –635.183 445.136
score
years of the humanitarian intervention, the political differences among the
leading intervening countries, notably the United States and European
Union countries, deepened over the political goals of the intervention and
how military force should be applied.The lack of coordination and effective
measures created conditions where UN peace-keeping forces often found
themselves under direct attack. In spring of 1995, for example, 325 French
peace-keepers were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs and used as human
shields during the NATO bombing campaign. The escalation of the conflict
is reflected in the downward trend in Figure 2 and the large spike in conflict
from March 1995 to August 1995. NATO air strikes led to an even further
increase in levels of violence (see Table 8 and especially Table 9, where the
mean of the Goldstein score of conflict and cooperation peaks at –1320.113
from –984.408 in the previous period in Table 8).
The final NATO campaign (August 1995) and the military advancement
of the Croats forced Bosnian Serbs to accept the negotiations in Dayton,
Ohio in November 1995. The nature of the intervention in Bosnia funda-
mentally changed beginning in August of 1995. First of all, the five contact
group countries9 that led the operation appeared to be more committed in
their decision to enforce the conditions of the Dayton agreement, which
later became the Treaty of Paris (consistent with hypothesis 3). Second, and
most critical to our main argument, the Dayton agreement gave the
Bosnian Serbs an almost autonomous status overtly recognizing the differ-
ent religious groups, something that was not included in the Vance–Owen
plan (consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2).As we see from the available data
ending in 1995, there has been a declining trend in the levels of violence
during and after the Dayton agreement negotiations. Both Figure 2 and
Table 10 suggest that conflict abates by 1995.
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TABLE 8
Goldstein score of conflict events, Bosnia, 01/1994–12/1994
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 12 –984.408 753.863
score
TABLE 9
Goldstein score of conflict events, Bosnia, 01/1995–08/1995
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 8 –1320.113 835.396
score
Although we do not have event data beyond the end of 1995, since 1996
Bosnia has been relatively stable with low levels of violence. The conflict
eventually was brought closer to settlement as the external actors towards
the end of 1995 tried to address issues and concerns critical for all three
fighting parties in Bosnia and engage them in active participation in peace-
building efforts. After all parties had agreed on the basic parameters of the
Dayton peace agreement, NATO’s multinational implementation force
(IFOR) had a one-year military mandate with concrete goals to establish a
secure environment. Once a secure environment was established, IGOs and
NGOs (such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)
were allowed to develop the civilian component of the operation. Once
IFOR’s mission was completed, the Stabilization force (SFOR) under the
UN Security Council Resolution 1088 was authorized to continue IFOR’s
role. SFOR actively participated with international organizations, and
national and local groups. Eight years after the Paris Treaty (1996), SFOR
and the civilian component of the humanitarian intervention have been
successful in preserving a secure environment.
The local population has attached a higher value to the international
reconstruction efforts than was the case in the early phases of the conflict.
The time and the effort invested have changed attitudes fundamentally, as
witnessed in the willingness of all three communities to collaborate with
international organizations and the International Criminal Court in the
trial of crimes against humanity (consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2).
Despite persistent economic difficulties and the problems related to the
transition from a war-torn former planned economy to a free market econ-
omy, both at the political and the economic level there are clear signs of
slow but steady progress and normalization in relations between the local
factions (Domin, 2001a, b). Although concerns of the sustainability of 
the currently secure environment after the departure of SFOR remain, the
aspiration of Bosnia and the other former Yugoslavian Republics to be
admitted in the enlarged European Union can provide a strong motivation
for the three communities to coexist and cooperate (i.e. Slovenia has been
a member since May 2004, Croatia starts negotiations to enter in 2007).
Four main reasons have helped to foster a stable peace in the case of
Bosnia. First, in accordance with hypothesis 3, after August of 1995 the
intervening parties applied consistent policies that were carefully planned
in advance and implemented, rather than uncoordinated responses to local
events. Second, even though the policy of partition that de facto followed
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TABLE 10
Goldstein score of conflict events, Bosnia, 09/1995–12/1995
Standard 
Variable Time periods Mean deviation
Goldstein conflict and cooperation 4 –561 664.532
score
the Dayton agreement (1995) and the Treaty of Paris (1996) has encroached
upon the rights of people to return to the areas in which they used to live,
partition can create conditions of trust and stability in the region if the
majority of the local population are essentially satisfied with the final out-
come, which lends support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Under certain condi-
tions, partitions help address the problem of commitment by authorities,
which many hold often to perpetuate communal conflicts (Lake and
Rothchild, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Sisk, 1999). People choose to live in areas
where they trust the local authorities. Third, the longer peace is preserved
in a war-torn region, the better are the chances for long-term stability, as
our application of cognitive dissonance theory suggests. Fourth, after the
Dayton agreement, recent developments show that at least in the issue of
war crimes tribunals, encouraging steps have been taken to build institu-
tions and normalize the relations among the three groups by both SFOR
(the NATO sponsored military operation) and the local governments.
Sisk (1999: 99) argues that the case of Bosnia attests to how mediation
and interventions can only have a limited impact. Sisk argues that the local
leaders whom the intervening parties choose can often have a detrimental
impact on the motivation of local populations. Depending on the coherence
of different groups in a country, good power-sharing measures should both
strengthen the position of moderates and accommodate hardliners (Sisk,
1999: xi). External actors, however, often play up certain political leaders
and place a great deal of confidence in political organizations or institutions
that fit with their own political beliefs and aspirations, even if these lack
widespread support in the local population.The paradoxical outcome noted
by Sisk stems from misunderstandings of the local social context and fail-
ure to achieve constructive cooperation with the local populations.
The difference in terms of the intervention policies in Bosnia and
Somalia was that the bombing campaign in Bosnia was immediately fol-
lowed by negotiations that included the leaders of the three ethnic/religious
groups. During the negotiations the American negotiator Richard
Holbrooke brought to the negotiation table the leaders of all parties who
were active participants in the conflict (Holbrooke, 1998). In his book To
End a War, Holbrooke described how he pushed aside his personal feelings
for and perceptions of the ‘blood thirsty’ leaders of the three ethnic/reli-
gious groups and the former President of Yugoslavia, Milosevic, to achieve
a lasting agreement. An example that illustrates how critical it is to involve
the local population is the fact that Holbrooke allowed the Bosnian Serbs
to use the name of ‘Republika Srpska’ despite its ‘bloody’ undertones.
Holbrooke was vehemently attacked for this decision. Nevertheless, this
insertion might have actually proved essential in bringing Bosnian Serbs on
board and motivating them to cooperate with the other two groups.
Conclusion
Our research has explored to what extent policies that involve the local
population can be applied to humanitarian interventions under different
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contexts and situations. Using cognitive dissonance theory we develop
three hypotheses regarding the role of the local population and its interac-
tion with external actors in the post-intervention peace-building process.
We argue that local participation is a necessary ingredient to reach a suc-
cessful settlement that will last. Looking at the cases of Somalia from 1987
to 1997 and Bosnia from 1991 until 1996 we juxtapose the monthly inci-
dents of violence to attempts by the UN and other intervening actors to
bring local leaders into the peace-building process. In real-life interventions
we cannot rely on the experimental designs used by psychology. However,
the event data analysis strongly corroborates our argument that during
periods where the local population is even partially involved in the inter-
vention process, the prospects for a long-lasting settlement increase.
In future research we hope to be able to evaluate whether cognitive dis-
sonance theory can account for the conditions under which populations in
target countries react in particular ways through survey research and pub-
lic opinion polls recording the beliefs and actions of the local population
towards the intervening parties. In this sense, Iraq provides an interesting
test case with large variations in strategies and outcomes at the local level.
An article in the New York Times on a success story in reconstruction
efforts in Northern Iraq illustrates the relevance of our research question
to both practitioners and students of future interventions and peace-
keeping operations (see Gordon, 2003). Major General David H. Petraeus,
commander of the US Army’s 101st Airborne Division, successfully
restored trade with Syria by brokering an agreement involving local leaders
and Iraqi customs officials. This in turn has generated substantial revenue
used to finance other reconstruction projects in the region. The success of
Petraeus’s efforts indicates the necessity of integrating local influential fig-
ures in the post-conflict reconstruction process, even if these formerly may
have been members of the Baath Party.
This study provides insights for how external interventions can be
designed to be more effective and better able to produce a stable peace.This
is the first step in building an extensive data set on local population involve-
ment in humanitarian interventions that will fill a gap in the existing litera-
ture of conflict resolution. Future research should look at a large numbers of
interventions to draw more general conclusions and policy implications that
can be of interest to researchers, practitioners and policy advocates.
Notes
We are grateful to Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Julie Mertus,
Katherine Barbieri and three anonymous reviewers for their comments and sug-
gestions on previous versions of the article.
1. In this article, we do not seek to evaluate the legitimacy of external interven-
tions. See Falk (1996) for discussion of the evolution of the status of interstate inter-
ventions in contending approaches to international law.
2. The recognition of all parties as legitimate participants is probably the most
important condition for a successful peace-keeping operation. This requirement
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stems from Human Rights Theory and the literature on conflict resolution, where
conflict resolution is defined as a situation where conflicting parties enter into an
agreement recognizing each other’s right to exist (Burrows, 1996; Wallensteen,
2002).
3. In the context of cognitive dissonance, belief and attitudes represent the state
of mind or disposition of an individual. Behavior is the result of a person’s reaction
to a situation, and/or group and individual interaction. Beliefs and attitudes shape
individual behaviour and the ways individuals interact with their surroundings.
Group behavior is an extension of individual behavior; but group dynamics can
often alter or reinforce individual behaviour.
4. Traditional persuasion theory suggests that attitudes cause behaviour.
Festinger and subsequent experimental research strongly suggest that the direction
of causality often runs in the opposite direction.
5. Our argument is not that cooperation with local elites is the only form of
meaningful local participation. However, in peace-building processes local elites
will pose as representatives of the population at large. We do not assume that local
elites necessarily represent the interests or goals of the whole or a majority of the
local population, rather the theory implies that locals are more likely to trust some-
one from their own background than outside leaders imposed by the interveners.
6. Somalia and Bosnia are often used for comparison in the study of humanitar-
ian interventions, as both are often seen as exemplifying the disastrous effects of
well-intended humanitarian interventions. For an extended discussion of the value
of comparing these cases, see Weiss and Collins (2000) and Pieterse (1997).
7. Although we recognize that several sub-groups with partly competing goals
can be identified in each of these cases, in this article we focus on the target state as
an aggregate. Our interest is to ascertain whether intervening forces include locals
at all in peace-building processes rather than whether they include individual
groups.
8. Menkhaus and Ortmayer (1995: 13–15) note that Aideed and UNOSOM had a
complicated relationship, where both sides emanated mistrust and misperceived the
actions of the other. Both the UN and the USA rejected alternative responses to the
murder of the Pakistani peace-keepers, leaving direct confrontation as the only
choice. Even then, the 3 October operation was directly orchestrated by the USA
without any UN involvement or consultation (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 1995: 22).
9. The contact group countries were USA, UK, France, Germany and Russia.
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